On Truth and Lies

Language cannot accurately represent Nature for language is nothing more than associations of phenomena with arbitrary symbols arranged in arbitrary patterns, what Nietzsche (aptly) considers illusions. In creating these illusions, Nietzsche finds us using multiple metaphors and mistaking the final product to be something real. As he puts it, “To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor,” (On Truth and Lies).  The words one speaks are copies of copies: an incomplete copy of an image in the mind which is only an incomplete copy of external phenomena.  As he rightly points out, these copies do not share any connection, “each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one,” (On Truth and Lies).  His account of the number of metaphors is more generous than biology demonstrates. Take hearing for example.  First, air waves travel and enter the ear canal which are then magnified by the shape.  Second, these air waves hit a membrane.  Third, this membrane causes one bone to strike another that in turn causes movement of a third bone.  Fourth, the third bone’s movement creates waves in a fluid filled canal.  Fifth, the fluid waves stimulate hair fibers that excite their attached nerve. Sixth, summarized information from the stimulation is sent through several areas of the brain until it reaches the primary auditory cortex.  Finally, the information bounces around a few different areas which allow us to perceive the sound. Air waves-mechanical movement-fluid waves-chemical and electrical impulses are all the metaphors that result in perception which we then turn into an arbitrary symbol, about 5 or 6 metaphors away instead of 2.  Of course, in a discussion such as this, few people would claim that the word they use to describe something and the thing they are describing are the same.  But in everyday use, the mistake most likely occurs.  If a person were to point at a tree and ask another what it is, that person will most likely say, “tree.”  The person would have been more correct to imitate the questioner by pointing at the tree and saying, “that is what it is.” 

Concepts, products of human psychology and language, are anthropomorphisms which are taken as absolutes.  Humans, when observing the world, find there to be too much stimulation that cannot be properly managed.  To make up for this abundance of information, we look at repeating instances of something, find commonalities, and create an archetypal image of the phenomena that is used to compare new instances and determine what the thing is.  Nietzsche uses leaves as an example: upon observing a particular leaf then a series of leaves, we strip away what makes each leaf unique and find what makes them the same.  We call this concept the leaf. In his words, “Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases,” (On Truth and Lies).  Language, in a way, demands this activity for language would prove to burdensome if each individual leaf (or any particular instance) required its own word.  Neither Nietzsche nor I fault a person for creating this concept, but the fault is warranted when the person erroneously concludes an existence outside the mind of the form of leaf of which the other leaves partake.  From this analysis of concept formation, Nietzsche concludes truth to be a form of deception, “Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions- they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force,” (On Truth and Lies).  After the long series of metaphors to perception and the melting down of innumerable particulars to create a blended, artificial image, we claim to know the essence of a thing.  Through such a process, we have so far removed ourselves from the thing which stimulated us that Nietzsche is appalled should we be joyful in proclaiming truth. 

Under this model of language, perception, and concept formation, Nietzsche is not convinced by our apparent need to discover truth, an attempt to turn the world into man. From this, he supports the life of the artist over the life of the scientist.  While the artist is irrational, they shall find more joy in their work.  The scientist and the artist each make the world into something it is not, but the scientist believes his lies while the artist knows their proclamations to be deceptive.  The scientist is self-limiting in making all their discovers conform to the fixed edifice of scientific knowledge.  But the artist knows that all perception and language are fiction, not fact, and gains unlimited creative potential.  Once one knows life is fiction, it can be written into any story imaginable, “That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect,” (On Truth and Lies).    While the world becomes the liberated intellect’s canvas, Nietzsche does place a limitation on aesthetic creativity: one may deceive so long as without injuring oneself.    Though an important point to remember if we want our artistic careers to last, I wonder about potential implications that may harm his project.  This line itself is not enough to support a full attack, but opens the door to speculation of other claims. If we can deceive ourselves to the point of injury while others are successfully unharmed, then perhaps some us are just more incorrect that others.  They mistake reality for something so far removed that it leads to poor judgments, resulting in harm.  This possibility makes me wonder if Nietzsche would agree that some people get closer to the mark when trying to explain the ‘truth’ of reality.  If there exist degrees of deception, then I don’t know if he has dissuaded me from being a scientist over an artist.  Why would the scientist not be a noble pursuit, if he can ever increase his accuracy? Word Count: